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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
case acquired a fixed, "vested" right upon the formulation of the contract, since
the beneficiary could not add or change the contingent payees. Mutual Ben. Ins.
Co. v. Ellis, 125 F. 2d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 1942). In re Deyo's Estate, 180 Misc.
32, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 379, 388 (Surr. Ct. 1943). When such a present interest is
transferred, it is immaterial that its enjoyment be subject to postponement, conditions, or complete defeasance (via the beneficiary's exercise of her right to
withdraw the principal sum). Ga Nun v. Palmer, 216 N. Y. 603, 609, 111 N. E.
223, 225 (1916). Matter of Tilley's Estate,supra. Chase Nat'l. Bank v. Mannfac.
Trust Co., supra. The payee, as a third-party beneficiary, may enforce the conditional right, since the contingency has taken place. Mutual Ben. Ins. Co. v. Ellis,
supra. Glandziz et al., v. Callinicos, 48 F. Supp. 732, 733 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
Restatement, Contracts, §134 (1932).
In the Ellis case, supra, the factual situation was almost identical with the
instant case, and the defendant raised the similar contention that the agreement
was invalid as an attempted testamentary disposition. As in the principal case,
the court ruled that no trust existed, and that the beneficiary's counter-offer had
resulted in a contract unconnected with one of insurance. Nevertheless, the court
held against defendant, and ruled that since plaintiff had acquired a fixed, vested
right upon the formulation of the contract, plaintiff was entitled to the proceeds
as a third-party donee-beneficiary, citing Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120
N. E. 639 (1918). Accord: In re Koss' Estate, 106 N. J. Eq. 323, 150 At.
360 (1930).
Since, in the instant case, the right was vested in the plaintiff inter vivos, its
enjoyment contingent upon the death of the beneficiary, it is submitted that the
property did not pass by reason of the death, and thus did not violate the Statute
of Wills.
Robert Alan Thompson
CONFLICTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-SUBSTANCE OR PROCEDURE
Plaintiff brought an action in N. Y. for specific performance against the
executor of Harold Rubin and others to enforce an oral agreement by which the
decedent had agreed not to change his existing will. The agreement was made in
Florida, decedents domicile, and the contract was valid by Florida law. The
N. Y. Pets, Prop. Law Sec. 31(7) requires such contracts to be in writing. Held:
the Statute of Frauds is substantive as to cases involving conflicts of law, and
consequently does not preclude enforcement of a contract valid according to the
law of the place in which it was made unless it violates the forum's paramount
Misc., 107 N. Y. S.
public policy. Rubin v. Irving Trust Co. et al., 2d 847 (Sup. Ct. 1951).

RECENT DECISIONS
The question of choice of law involves the problem of characterization. If

a statute is procedural the applicable law is that of the forum, if substantive, the
law of the place of making applies. Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 134 (2d ed.
1951). If it is found that the foreign Statute of Frauds is applicable it is clear
that its enforcement will not be a violation of New York's paramount public
policy. Crane v. Powell 139 N. Y. 379, 34 N. E. 911 (1893).
Heretofore the question of forms of action, Nowell v. Waterman, 53 I. I.
16, 163 Ad. 402 (1932); parties to a suit, Ruhe v. Buck 124 Mo. 178, 27 S.W.
412 (1894), Frykiund v. Great Northern R. Co. 101 Minn. 37, 111 N. W. 727
(1907); venue, Restatement, Conflict of Laws Sec. 586 (1934); rules of practice
and pleading, Restatement, Conflict of Laws Sec. 592 (1934); and res ipsa loquitur, Judd v. Sams, 270 App. Div. 981, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 678 (4th Dept. 1946),
Lobel v. American Airlines Inc. 192 F. 2d 217 (2nd Cir., 1951)Y have been

characterized as procedural and, therefore, controlled by the law of the forum.
The same characterization and the concomitant control of the law of the
forum has been attributed to burden of proving negligence of the defendant
and freedom from contributory negligence of plaintiff, Wright v. Palmison 237
App. Div. 22, 260 N. Y. Supp. 812 (2nd Dept. 1932), Clark v. Harniscbfeger
Sales Corp. 282 App. Div. 493, 264 N. Y. Supp. 873 (2nd Dept., 1933). But
see Fitzpatrick -v. International R. Co. 252 N. Y. 127, 169 N. E. 112 (1929).
To the same effect are the questions of competency of witnesses and admissibility
of evidence, Brotherhod of Railroad Trainmen v. Long 186 Ark. 320, 535 S. W.
2d 433 (1932), and to statutes of limitations in the absence of a borrowing
statute. U. S. Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Ruggles 258 N. Y. 32, 179 N. E. 250
(1932).
The history of the characterizatidn of the Statute of Frauds reveals that its
treatment has been far. from consistent. The leading English case, Leroux v.
Brown, 12 C. B. 801 (1852) held that the question (as to whether it be of substance or of procedure) depended on the form in which the statute was drawn.
(If the statute said "no action shall be brought" it was regarded as procedural, if it
said the contract shall be "void" it was regarded is substantive). American decisions have characterized the Statute of Frauds alternately as procedural, Townsend
v. Hargreaves 118 Mass. 325 (1875) and as substantive, Cochran v. Ward 5 Ind.
App. 89, 29 N. E. 795, 31 N. E. 581 (1892), and some courts have held that the
statute of the forum is applied as a matter of public policy. Barboun v. Campbell
101 Kan. 616, 168 Pac. 879 (1917). There has been a conflict of opinion in the
New York courts. In Turnow v. Hockstander 7 Hun 80 (N. Y. 1876) the law
of the place of performance was held to apply, while in Smith v. Compania Litografica de la Habana 220 App. Div. 782, 222 N. Y. Supp. 902 (2d Dept., 1926)
it was held that the intention 6f the parties controlled. In 1916 the Court of

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Appeals pointed out the irreconcilable conflict of the decisions in this regard,
Reilley v.-Steinhart 217 N. Y. 549, 112 N. E. 468 (1916) and subsequently
refused to answer the question directly. FranklinSugar Refining Co. V. Lipowicz
247 N. Y. 465, 160 N. B. 916 (1928). Only recently it has been held that in the
absence of an express intention to the contrary the N. Y. Statute of Frauds (N. Y.
Pers. Prop. Law Sec. 31(1) is to be characterized as substantive. Silverman v'.
Indevco Inc. 106 N. Y. S. 2d 699 (1951). It was Story's original position that
the requirement of writing under the Statute of Frauds is substantive, Story,
Conflict of Laws §262 (1st ed., 1834), and his views were urged upon the English
court in Leroux v. Brown, supra.
Professor Morgan has expressed the view that the law of the locus should
be applied even to matters of procedure if they are likely to have a material
influence on the outcome of the case as long as its application would not violate
the public policy of the forum. Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 Harv.
L Rev. 153, 195 (1944).
It is submitted that the court in the principal case follow the better rule in
characterizing the N. Y. Statute of Frauds as substantive. Effect is thus given to
the contract valid in the state where made, which has the closest connection with
the contract, and the outcome of the case will not depend on the state in which
it is tried but will be the same in the forum as well as in the place of the making
of the contract.
Phyllis I. Hubbard
MONOPOLIES-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-ORGANIZED

BASEBALL

Plaintiff, a professional baseball player, sued the defendant baseball clubs
and leagues under the Sherman Act (26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. §§1, 2) and
Clayton Act (38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C A. §15), alleging that he was deprived of
his livelihood by the defendants. The complaint was dismissed for want of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; the court holding that baseball was not
interstate commerce and defendant's activity was not within the purview of the
antitrust legislation. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. et al., 101 F. Supp. 93
(S. D. Cal. 1951).
The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 in order to suppress devices and
practices which tend toward monopolies in restraint of interstate commerce.
U. S. v. Colgate, 250 U. S. 300 (1919); D. R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products
Ref. Co., 236 U. S. 165 (1915); Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197
(1904). Early applications of the statute were limited to activities which were
obviously interstate commerce. U. S. v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505

